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A SOVIET DEFECTOR SAYS HE WAS A SPY FOR U.S. FOR YEARS

In New Book, Ex-U.N. Diplomat
Says He Passed Kremlin's
Secrets for 32 Months

By ROBERT D. McFADDEN

For 32 months before his defection to the United States in 1978, Arkady N. Shevchenko, a top Soviet diplomat, passed Soviet secrets to American intelligence agents while serving as Under Secretary General of the United Nations, the defector says in a new book.

Mr. Shevchenko, the highest-ranking Soviet official ever to defect, says he gave Washington information on Soviet positions in the strategic arms limitation talks, told of frictions and maneuvers inside the Kremlin and provided secrets on Soviet planning and intentions in Europe, Africa, Central America and other foreign policy arenas.

Before he stopped spying when confronted with a summons to return to Moscow, Mr. Shevchenko also gave Washington extensive Soviet cable traffic to and from the United Nations and Washington, enabling the Americans to decode a wide range of other secret Soviet messages around the world.

Insights About Leaders

No major coups for the United States are cited in the book, and a former senior United States intelligence official agreed that there had been no major breakthroughs. But he said Mr. Shevchenko supplied insights into many Soviet moves and into the plans and motives of the Soviet leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko and other members of the Central Committee and the policy-making Politburo.

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Democrat of New York, who was the chief United States representative at the United Nations when Mr. Shevchenko was a spy, said: "For the first time we got an understanding of how Soviet foreign policy is made and how it is operating. The persons who would need to know that, who would want to know that, think it was invaluable. Nothing like it had ever happened before."

Microfilm in Razors

The book, "Breaking with Moscow," to be published this month by Alfred A. Knopf, is a 370-page account of Mr. Shevchenko's life as a spy in New York from the autumn of 1975 until April 1978, when he announced that he had refused an order from Moscow to return home and would remain in the United States.

At the time, there were unconfirmed reports that Mr. Shevchenko had secretly been working for American intelligence during the latter part of his five-year term as Under Secretary General for Political and Security Council Affairs. His job was the No. 2 United Nations civil service post, just under that of the Secretary General, who then was Kurt Waldheim.

Mr. Shevchenko's book has provided the first confirmation of those espionage activities, which, by his account, were suggested by American intelligence officials after Mr. Shevchenko initially approached a United States diplomat at the United Nations in 1975 and indicated he wanted to defect.

Besides describing some of the secrets he passed, the book details many clandestine activities — meetings in safe houses, microfilm hidden in razors and the pretenses and uncertainties of spying. It also describes the agonizing fears of exposure and the intense pressures that led him to heavy drinking and a relationship with a woman who said she was paid by American intelligence officials — the same pressures that drove his wife to commit suicide in Moscow after his defection.

For the nearly seven years since his defection, Mr. Shevchenko, who is 54 years old, has been living quietly in the Washington area, writing his book, giving lectures at fees up to \$12,000 apiece, and occasionally providing information to United States officials. He remarried five years ago.

"I had everything except a very small thing — my own personal freedom," Mr. Shevchenko recalled in an interview with Mike Wallace on the CBS News program "60 Minutes," which was broadcast last night.

"I had to live in a country where everything, everybody, has to be hypocritical, even in the family," he said. "You cannot even openly talk with your own wife, with your friends. You live in a situation where you are forced to pretend all the time. That's why I consider this system pushed me out of the Soviet Union. I could not just stand it anymore."

Senator Moynihan said during the broadcast that he was one of a handful of officials — including President Gerald R. Ford, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and William E. Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence — who knew of the espionage activities.

The Senator said he had even played a minor role in helping to deceive the Soviets.

"I helped by being as disagreeable in public as I possibly could," the Senator recalled about his attitude toward Mr. Shevchenko. "I would indicate my disdain for the Stalinist apparatchik, this self-evident agent of his own Government working in the Security Council, in the Secretariat, as if he was an independent civil servant, which, of course, he was not."

Born in the Ukraine on Oct. 11, 1930, Arkady Nikolayevich Shevchenko was trained at the Moscow Institute of International Relations, getting a doctorate in 1954. He joined the Foreign Ministry two years later and, as one of the youngest and brightest members of the Soviet diplomatic corps, moved up quickly.

After a term of service in the 1960's as a Soviet delegate to the United Nations in New York, he returned to Moscow and became a top adviser and protégé of Mr. Gromyko's.

From 1970 to 1973 he was close to Mr. Gromyko and other policy-makers in the Politburo and the Foreign Ministry, sitting in on major deliberations and observing the inner workings of the highest levels of Soviet Government.

In 1973 he was named to the \$87,000-a-year post as United Nations Under Secretary, a post that required an oath to serve as an independent international civil servant. A Soviet official loyal to his Government had traditionally been appointed to that position.

Mr. Shevchenko came to be regarded by most associates as an amiable but rather faceless functionary in the job, administering a staff of 90 subordinates with a tight rein and preparing political analyses for Mr. Waldheim.

He also conferred regularly with other officials, attended dinners and other functions, occasionally poked fun at Soviet officialdom and seemed, on the surface at least, to be a typical Soviet official with a built-in distrust of things Western.

The Initial Approach

His book gives an extraordinary account of a spy's recruitment and activities. After much soul-searching, Mr. Shevchenko relates, he decided to defect in the autumn of 1975 and quietly approached a United States official at a diplomatic dinner. He did not name the official but said he regarded him as a friend.

"I've decided to break with my Government and I want to know in advance what the American reaction would be if I asked for asylum," Mr. Shevchenko said he told the official.

The official "gaped at me in amazement," he wrote, and said: "What? Are you serious, Arkady?"

"I'm completely serious," he said he replied.

His friend "looked stunned," Mr. Shevchenko writes, but agreed to inform officials in Washington and "make inquiries for you."

A few days later, Mr. Shevchenko relates, a note was left for him in a certain volume at the United Nations Library. It proposed a secret rendezvous a few nights later. After some circuitous travel to avoid any followers, he slipped into a brownstone on the Upper East Side.

The place was a "safe house" being used by American intelligence, he said. There he met a man who introduced himself as "Bert Johnson." He did not know it at the time, but this man was to become his point of contact with the Central Intelligence Agency.

In response to Mr. Shevchenko's request for asylum, Mr. Johnson made a counterproposal.

"Would I consider staying on as Under Secretary General for a while?" Mr. Shevchenko writes. "There was a lot of information I could provide from that vantage point if we worked together. I could help them find out more about Soviet planning and intentions, about the leadership's thinking. Besides, he pointed out, I would need to get my family ready for the eventual defection."

Agonizing over what to do for several days, Mr. Shevchenko recalled:

"I had long felt a distaste for the world of spying and deceit. I was well aware of the dangers. I vividly remembered the public trial in 1963 of Col. Oleg Penkovsky, who was shot immediately afterward. Almost without exception spies, sooner or later, were caught, even the best, such as Col. Rudolf Abel during the 1950's. Moreover I was no adventurous James Bond type. Nor did I have any training for spying."

'The Awful Truth'

He finally decided to decline the offer. "Then the awful truth came to me that I really had no choice in the matter," he wrote. "If they wished, they could make me do it. The Americans could prove to the Soviets that I was a traitor. They could blackmail me. I knew that the world of espionage had its own rules, and suspected that the K.G.B. had no exclusive claim on ruthlessness. I realized I was trapped."

He was given a code name, "Andy." In meetings at the brownstone, at a suite at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel and later in an apartment behind his own East Side building, he began to report regularly to Mr. Johnson and to another agent, who called himself Bob Ellenber.

In the Soviet-American talks on a second strategic arms agreement, which were then under way, Mr. Shevchenko provided advance information on Soviet positions.